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but also live farther from the city center. Winners are more isolated from tradi­
tional family and caste networks and have less access to risk-sharing arrangements. 
Additionally, winners report both less social insurance and greater collective action 
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1 Introduction
Throughout the developing world, urban poverty is an increasingly important policy con­
cern (Chen et al., 2007). A stark reflection of this is the high and growing incidence of 
urban slums: Today, over a billion people live in slums in developing countries (UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). The growth of urban slums poses multiple challenges 
for city governments: Slum dwellers have significant unmet need for basic services and 
often occupy prime real estate in commercially important city centers.
An attractive proposition for many municipal governments, therefore, is to relocate 
slum dwellers to improved housing on the peripheries of cities. Slum relocation programs 
typically presume that the value of improved housing is adequate compensation for any 
costs incurred from living farther afield, such as diminished work opportunities or weak­
ened social networks. However, the presumed high value of improved housing remains a 
largely untested proposition, as does the presumption that, once relocated, slum dwellers 
prefer not to remigrate back to the city center. More specifically, the coercive nature of 
many of these programs complicates any cost-benefit analysis, since it prevents us from 
inferring the actual costs and benefits to slum dwellers from their choices on whether 
to relocate to city periphery and for how long. For programs that are voluntary, cost- 
benefit analysis is made difficult by the fact that households that choose to relocate are 
likely different in several ways (in terms of socioeconomic status, work opportunities etc.). 
Finally, it is hard to generalize findings from programs implemented by municipal govern­
ments, since these agencies often base their decisions to relocate slums on political and 
commercial exigencies.
In this paper, we exploit a unique experimental opportunity afforded by a volun­
tary slum dweller relocation program undertaken by a leading trade union for poor self­
employed women (Self Employed Women’s association, hereafter SEWA) in partnership 
with the city government in the Indian city of Ahmedabad. This program had several
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features that help us address the above concerns. First, it was conceived by a labor union 
that sought to prioritize its members’ well-being. Second, while slum dwellers’ participa­
tion in the program was voluntary, the actual opportunity to relocate was determined by 
a lottery conducted in 1987. This randomization of relocation opportunity allows us to 
tackle the concern that housing choices are typically endogenous to a household’s social 
and economic outcomes, including education, health, and social networks.1 Finally, the 
497 households that entered the program were spread across several slums in the city 
center and represented an important group of informal sector workers namely, women 
who make unfiltered cigarettes, or beedis. (Over 1.4 million women in India earn a living 
doing this work, making it one of the largest female informal labor sectors (Office of the 
Registrar General, Census Commissioner, 2001).) Thus, we anticipate the impacts we 
identify should be reasonably generalizable to fast-growing cities in South Asia.
Households that won the housing lottery were given the opportunity to move into their 
new housing in a suburban neighborhood (from now on, Colony A) in 1993. We tracked 
and interviewed 443 lottery applicants (89% of full sample) roughly 14 years later in 2007. 
The random allocation of housing units provides a rare source of exogenous variation in 
residential location akin to the Moving to Opportunity experiment in the US (Kling et al., 
2007). Moreover, the length of time that has passed since subjects were provided housing 
in the new location allows examination of outcomes over a uniquely long period.
We present Intent to Treat (ITT) experimental estimates in which we compare out­
comes of those who won the lottery to those who lost it. Our first striking finding is that 
nearly 40% of households that won the opportunity to relocate to the urban periphery 
at a substantial subsidy bought the new home, but chose not to move into it. Low rates 
of relocation among selected households that worked hard to get access to this program 
presumably reflected the relatively remote location of the housing, which turned out to
1 For example, we could mistake the effects of living in distant neighborhoods for the characteristics 
of households that choose to live in distant neighborhoods.
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be farther from the city center than was originally planned. Given that housing quality 
was higher in the new location, we consider low rates of relocation as our first piece of 
evidence that geographic centrality is economically valuable to slum dwellers.
The remainder of our analysis sheds light on both the nature of this economic advan­
tage and the response of poor households. Fourteen years after houses were built in Colony 
A, we see no difference in the economic well-being of winner and non-winner households, 
as measured by current income, labor force participation, educational attainment and the 
marriage patterns of their children. Winners, however, do live roughly one mile farther 
away from the city center, and have worse access to health (though not school) facili­
ties. We also observe significant changes in family and neighborhood networks. Winners 
are approximately 18% less likely to have adult working sons live with them. Winners 
live further from their daughters and are 16% less likely to see their adult daughters fre­
quently. Turning to neighborhood networks, winners are more likely to have bidi workers 
as immediate neighbors, but these neighbors are less likely to belong to the respondent's 
caste.
Lottery participants uniformly report that they rely on neighborhood networks for 
borrowing and lending needs. The changes in network composition are, therefore, reflected 
in winners stating that they are 7 percentage points less likely to know someone on whom 
they can rely for borrowing needs and have, on average, known this person for three fewer 
years. They also report less access to transfers and help during periods of shock.
To examine the economic impact of these changes in network, we consider two sets of 
outcomes. First, we make use of the fact that the urban poor in Ahmedabad faced a series 
of shocks over the last ten years (floods, earthquake and a viral epidemic). Winners and 
non-winners were as likely to be impacted by these shocks and lose, on average, a month's 
work as a result. The extent of informal help is relatively low, perhaps reflecting the 
aggregate nature of these shocks. That said, both in terms of whether they received any
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help and the amount of monetary help received, lottery winners are significantly worse 
off.
At the same time, relative to non-winners, winners report more collective action to 
benefit their neighborhood over the last three years. While we cannot fully rule out the 
possibility that this reflects a greater need for neighborhood infrastructure, the fact that 
these differences in collective action show up more than ten years after individuals moved 
into the complex suggests that it is likely driven, in part, by greater willingness to engage 
in local public good provision.
The patterns suggest that moving to the city periphery weakened traditional (caste and 
family) network links and created new links with neighbors. Winners are also significantly 
less likely to report lending to or borrowing from someone outside of their neighborhood, 
suggesting that moving led to greater geographic isolation. The change in neighbor com­
position, in turn, has important implications for informal risk-sharing: Neighbors are 
significantly less likely to belong to the same caste and significantly more likely to be in 
the same occupation. While winners and non-winners are equally likely to socialize and 
rely on neighbors for help, risk-sharing capacity of occupation-based and residential-based 
networks is arguably lower. That is, closer links with immediate neighbors increase the 
feasibility of cooperation around a local public good, but reduce the capacity to risk-share 
in a setting where economic shocks have an important spatial component.
Taken together, our findings suggest that in the long run households are able to equal­
ize across many margins of economic opportunity. Fourteen years after lottery winners 
received an opportunity for improved housing we find a relatively small (9 pp) difference 
in home ownership, and the value of housing stock is similar across the two groups. What 
is harder to maintain is networks — the shape of networks varies significantly across win­
ners and non-winners, and it appears that while winners benefit from the community's 
greater willingness to provide public goods they face diminished risk-sharing opportuni­
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ties. Qualitative evidence from in-depth interviews with a small sample of winners and 
non-winners conducted in 2011 supports this interpretation: While acknowledging the 
benefits of homeownership, winners were explicit about both the higher transportation 
costs and relative isolation induced by moving to Colony A. Our findings are also consis­
tent with other evidence from India which relates low labor mobility (from rural to urban 
areas) to household reliance on traditional networks.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical 
and empirical literature that motivates the study. Section 3 describes the context of our 
study, the data-collection strategy and dataset. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy 
and provides the results, Section 5 describes our findings from in-depth interviews and 
Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature R eview
To place our study in context, we describe the alternative forms of public housing assis­
tance programs implemented for the urban poor, and then review the literature on the 
impact of such programs on the well-being of the urban poor.
2.1 Form s o f H ousing A ssistan ce
Rent subsidies, as a form of housing assistance for the urban poor, have a long history 
in developed economies (Arnott, 1995). Often these rent subsidy programs are com­
bined with voluntary housing relocation programs. Two well-known (and well-studied) 
programs in the US are the Gautreaux and Moving To Opportunity (MTO) programs. 
Under Gautreaux, nearly 7,000 families were offered housing in suburban and urban 
neighborhoods with a black population of 30% or less (Office of Policy Development and
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Research, 1979).2 The MTO program covered 4, 600 low-income families across five US 
cities. Starting in 1994, households were randomly allocated two types of housing vouch­
ers: One group was “restricted” to using the voucher only in a location with a poverty rate 
below 10% while the other group was unrestricted. A control group received no voucher.
In developing economies, housing (and rent subsidies) are often provided by employ­
ers — for instance, in China there is a long history of state-subsidized housing for public 
sector workers (Wang, 2011). In some cases, the state provides social insurance by con­
tinuing to subsidize housing for unskilled workers by private employers (such as textile 
mills) after the employer declares bankruptcy (Field et al., 2008). That said, a dominant 
form of housing for the urban poor remains slum dwelling. Slum dwellers, typically, are 
either squatters or pay rent to a landlord. However, even in the latter case they tend 
to have tenurial insecurity as landlords have an incentive to provide short-term contracts 
in order to prevent renters from obtaining property rights (or long-run tenancy rights).3 
Consequently housing policy for the urban poor in low-income settings has often focused 
on improving property rights for slum dwellers, either in situ or via relocation (Field and 
Kremer, 2006).
Housing programs which seek to move slum dwellers to improved housing on the fringes 
of the city are growing in importance in the developing world. Below, we briefly highlight 
some important slum relocation programs in low-income countries.
India's Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation estimated a shortage of 
over 21 million houses for economically weaker sections in 2007, and several programs 
aim to increase supply and assist homebuyers (MHUPA, 2009).4 In 2009, the Indian
2 The program was a response to a lawsuit suggesting that Department of Housing and Urban Devel­
opment (HUD) policy denied poor black families the opportunity to live in integrated neighborhoods.
3 In the slums of Ahmedabad, a verbal ten-year guarantee of non-eviction from the municipal cor­
poration is the most common form of tenure security (Baruah, 2010). Also, ownership rights are 
created for renters in the private market who occupy a dwelling and keep up with payments on a 
lease contract longer than 11 months (Dev and Dey, 2006).
4 For instance, The Ministry of Urban Housing and Poverty Alleviation’s Affordable Housing in Part­
nership scheme aims to build one million housing units for the urban poor that they can purchase
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government unveiled an ambitious housing program for slum dwellers — the Rajiv Awas 
Yojana. A stated aim of the program is to relocate slum dwellers when on-site slum 
improvement is infeasible.
In Philippines, at the end of her second term in 2010, President Gloria Arroyo reported 
to have built and distributed houses to one million homeless Filipinos while in office. She 
claimed her programs were more successful than predecessors' due to the focus on nearby 
jobs (Inquirer, 2010). Finally, in Brazil, the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House, My 
Life) program built one million homes between 2009 and 2011. It was considered such a 
success that phase 2 of the program is to build another 2 million units by 2014. While the 
government is making a large investment to fully fund construction, developers are pre­
selling units to private investors (at a discount) who will sell finished units to low-income 
families at a price capped by the government.5
2.2 Im pact o f H ousing Program s
An old and new literature supports the view that cities underpin long-term economic 
dynamism through the spatial concentration of skills and ideas, and other gains from 
agglomeration of production (Jacobs, 1970; Moretti, 2010; Glaeser, 2011). The size and 
sprawl of many contemporary cities combined with the residential segregation and spa­
tial inequality of public services imply that access to markets and social networks may 
be highly localized even in population-dense environments (Hewett and R.Montgomery, 
2001).
Programs that cause the urban poor to relocate may influence economic outcomes 
through several channels. First, they may influence the employment opportunities for 
beneficiaries. Second, they can alter investments in, and long-run outcomes for, children.
Third, they may alter the peers and social networks of households and thereby related out­
with subsidized mortgages (MHUPA, 2011).
5 For more details, see the project website: www.myhousemylifebrazil.com.
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comes. Finally, changes in neighborhood characteristics may have significant externalities 
such as access to health care and exposure to crime.
Often housing programs also include an additional wealth effect — either directly by 
subsidizing rent or mortgage or indirectly by improving the household's asset base (by 
enabling access to credit markets through collateral).
Below, we first discuss the evidence on how relocation programs influence outcomes, 
and then turn to impacts of the wealth effect.
2.2.1 Location Impacts
Employment A first question is whether relocating poor households to improved housing 
in a new location creates a spatial mismatch between residential location and employment 
opportunities. Engleman (1977) exploited variation in council housing location to show 
that residential relocation farther away from jobs significantly increased the probability 
of quitting a job for men but not for women in Glasgow.6 An important caveat is that 
the study had a low response rate (only 60% of the sample were interviewed), and the 
response rate was lower among the control group (relative to the mover group). More re­
cent evidence comes from the Gautreaux and MTO programs. Individuals enrolled in the 
Gautreaux program who moved to locations with more low-skilled job opportunities were
significantly more likely to be employed, controlling for human capital, family character­
istics, education, and years since move (Popkin et al., 1993). It is worth noting that while
evaluations of the Gautreaux program typically argue that location choice was exogenous,
individuals had the right to refuse the first two locations the HUD offered them.7
6
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In addition to using a sample of 400 households who had been allocated council housing 6-10 months 
before they were surveyed, he identified a control group by randomly selecting a subset of families 
who were offered council housing in the next round of allocation. Surveying the control group at the 
same time as the movers group meant the control had been allocated council housing, but had not 
yet moved.
Popkin et al. (1993) report that only 5% of households refuse the first location shown out of fear 
another housing offer will not appear, and approximately half of households end up in a location 
other than those for which they expressed a preference.
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Some of the best data on this issue is experimental evidence from MTO. Rosenbaum 
and Harris (2001) find improvements in employment rates in the short term for MTO 
restricted-voucher recipients. However, interim and long-run findings do not find a statis­
tically significant impact of the unrestricted voucher on employment or earnings (Kling 
et al., 2007).
For urban poor in low-income countries, moving workers to better housing in more 
distant locations often worsens their economic opportunities. Using data on renters in 
Mumbai, Takeuchi et al. (2008) estimate that households are willing to give up Rs. 280 
to Rs. 330 per month to relocate 1 km closer to the principal workers job.
Child outcomes Geographic location determines access to schools and hospitals, health 
environment, as well as exposure to accidents and violence. Thus, programs that relocate 
households may potentially influence children’s long-term outcomes.
Using data from the Gautreaux demonstration, Rosenbaum (1995) finds that, com­
pared to youth who moved to urban locations, youth who moved to suburban locations are 
more likely to have jobs with good pay, though no more likely to be in college. However, 
in a later study of public housing demolitions in the same city, Jacob (2004) found that 
children in families who were offered the opportunity to relocate out of high-rise public 
housing did no better than their peers. Similarly, Oreopolous (2003) finds no differences in 
long-term labor market outcomes for adults assigned to different Toronto public housing 
projects as children: “.. .  despite significant contrast in living conditions and exposure to 
crime across projects, neighborhood quality does not make much difference to chances for 
labor market success in the long run” (p. 1536).
The MTO demonstration found short-term reductions in injuries and asthma attacks in 
Boston (Katz et al., 2001). Longer-term studies using data from all five sites find improved 
educational outcomes and mental health for female children in households given vouchers 
to move to lower poverty neighborhoods (Katz et al., 2011). Girls’ physical health was
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unaffected. Male children in the same situation engaged in more risky behaviors and their 
physical health declined.
Social interactions and peer effects Relocation is likely to disrupt a household’s social 
networks, and its impact on households will vary with both the composition of the new 
neighborhood and the relative ease of forming new ties. Long-run evidence from MTO 
shows that households that moved reported more social ties with relatively more affluent 
households and reported feeling safer. However, this change in peers and social ties did 
not lead to economic gains.
In low-income settings, residential segregation into religious, linguistic and caste-based 
enclaves is common (Vithayathil and Singh, 2011); relocation programs not based on these 
characteristics are likely to create neighborhoods with greater initial ethnic heterogeneity 
than those into which households would self-select. The accompanying cost of disruption 
of social networks may be relatively high. Takeuchi et al. (2008) explain the importance 
of social dimensions particular to South Asia: “...if households depend on neighbors of 
the same caste or ethnic group for information about employment or for social services, 
relocation to neighborhoods of different ethnicity may be welfare-reducing” (p. 1).
There are few quantitative estimates of the significance of neighbor effects in the 
urban areas of developing countries. Montgomery and Hewett (2005); Barnhardt (2009) 
are exceptions, but neither focuses on livelihood outcomes.8 Kapoor et al. (2004) estimate 
models of location choice in urban India (Pune) and find significant costs from relocation 
in terms of disruption of religious and linguistic networks. Geographic isolation from 
one’s peers or caste group could worsen employment outcomes by limiting information
8 More broadly, peer effects are studied by several papers: Conley and Udry (2001) looked for the 
influence of farmers’ success with fertilizer on a neighbor’s future decision to use fertilizer and 
profits when fertilizer is adopted. Kremer and Miguel (2004) found that information about de- 
worming drugs was spread child-to-child and adolescents whose friends were randomly treated were 
less likely to take the drugs themselves. There is also evidence from Mexico that school attendance 
is influenced by students’ friends (Bobonis and Finan, 2009), and in Kenya, students’ performance 
on exams increased when their classmates became eligible for exam-based rewards (Kremer et al., 
2004).
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about job opportunities or disrupting business networks (limiting access to customers or 
capital).
An interesting study of the links between housing isolations, social networks and time 
investment choices is Ward (2006). He uses experimental data from undergraduate stu­
dents living in Harvard College housing, and confirms that those randomly allocated to 
a location farther from the area where most students live and most activities take place 
participate less in central activities. Rather, they spend more time with local networks 
and local activities, with local networks becoming denser as a result. Students assigned 
to distant locations are also more satisfied with their housing and local public goods are 
more abundant there.
2.2.2 W ealth Impacts
Employment Effects Housing subsidies may encourage households to stay in locations 
that are undesirable along non-price dimensions. In India, Field et al. (2008) study 
location-based exposure to religious rioting and find more violence against Muslims in 
religiously integrated mill neighborhoods in Ahmedabad. They suggest households were 
more likely to stay in integrated neighborhoods — despite knowing the greater risk of 
communal violence there — because of high transaction costs around transferring property 
rights for homes in former cotton mill tenements. The loss of wealth associated with 
selling a mill home and moving to a religiously segregated neighborhood may have locked 
households into a neighborhood where they were less safe.
Less dramatically, subsidies may lock households into neighborhoods with fewer jobs
(overall or for low-skilled workers, see for instance Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1985). 9
Iyer et al. (2011) show that in China, access to state housing subsidies caused households
9 The authors analyze General Household Survey data in the UK and find Council Housing tenants 
were four times less likely to migrate to another region than owner-occupiers. They suggest a 
contributing factor to this difference was rent control, which limited the supply of rental units 
outside Council Housing (Hughes and McCormick, 1987).
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to continue working in the public sector even when job opportunities were relatively better 
in the private sector.
Labor supply A related issue is whether wealth effects associated with rent subsidy 
programs create an incentive for recipients to work less. Nickell (1980) finds higher male 
unemployment rates among those renting public rather than private housing in the UK. 
In contrast, Ong (1998) considers a sample of women in the US and finds rental voucher 
recipients work considerably more than women living in public housing and those renting 
in the private market. Fischer (2000), however, finds a significant negative relationship 
between labor force behaviors (employment rate and hours worked) and receiving housing 
assistance when the two types of assistance are pooled. All three studies are observational 
and seek to account for selection effects by adding controls for various demographic and 
economic characteristics of the households. It is likely that these controls are unable to 
fully account for the potential self-selection of poorer households (with specific employ­
ment traits) into public housing. Jacob and Ludwig (2012) study a program that used a 
lottery to allocate over-subscribed housing vouchers to 18,810 families in Chicago. Com­
pared to the 64,497 remaining families, labor force participation among adults receiving 
assistance were 6% lower and quarterly earnings 10% lower.
A second body of evidence directly examines the link between improved property 
rights and labor supply (holding location fixed). Field (2007) studied the impact of a 
titling program in Peruvian slums that was rolled out over time and finds that the net 
effect of titling (without relocation) is a combination of an increase in total labor force 
hours and a reallocation of work hours from inside the home to the outside labor market. 
There was also a significant reduction in child labor caused by stronger property rights. 
In short, when a dwelling did not require protection by a household member to ensure its 
continued possession, labor market outcomes were positive.
Children’s Outcomes Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) test the importance of formal
13
titling among slum-dwellers in Buenos Aires, using variation created by landowners’ dif­
ferential responses to government expropriation of their land to give it formally to poor 
households already living there. They find greater investments in children’s education 
among those with formal property rights, but these investments are not financed through 
greater borrowing.
Credit Market and Housing Investments Both Field (2007) and Galiani and Schar- 
grodsky (2010) find significant increases in housing investment when property is formally 
titled, but no evidence that these are related to improvements in access to credit. In both 
papers, investment effects appear to reflect changes in the incentives to invest as tenure 
security increases.
2.3 G aps in th e  L iterature
The MTO demonstration studies in the US have provided rigorous experimental long­
term estimates of the impact of living in a neighborhood with a low poverty rate. The 
socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods have little effect on the economic self­
sufficiency of adults, but do have some impact on girls’ education and on health outcomes. 
There is also a rich literature on peer effects in the US, with papers like Ward (2006) 
and Sacerdote and Marmaros (2006) providing evidence that location choice influences 
networks and the extent of isolation influences investments.
Evidence for low-income settings is, however, much more limited. In this study we 
hope to address some of the gaps in the literature.
3 Background and D ata
In this section we first describe the setting of our study and the study population. Next, 
we describe how the trade union conceived of the housing program and the design of the
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housing lottery. After this, we describe our tracking of the lottery sample and survey 
design. We conclude with a randomization check on the tracked sample.
3.1 Slum s in A hm edabad
Ahmedabad, with a population of roughly 3.5 million, is India’s sixth most populous city 
and the largest city in Gujarat, one of India’s most industrialized and fastest-growing 
states (Ministry of Finance, 2007). The urban poverty rate in Ahmedabad, a densely 
populated metropolis (roughly 718 persons per square kilometer), is roughly 1.4 times the 
All India average at about 34% (Cities Alliance, 2002), largely on account of the steady 
decline of Ahmedabad’s textile industry.
Housing for the urban poor came up in the vicinity of the textile mills, and either 
consisted of units rented out by the mills or informal settlements. A textile mill would 
typically attract migrant workers with similar occupational and caste backgrounds, which 
meant these neighborhoods were usually segregated by caste (Gillion, 1968). The decline 
of textile mills, which began in the 1960s and was most severe in the 1980s, significantly 
increased informal sector employment among these migrant workers(Breman, 2004). Their 
living arrangements, however, continue to consist of slums, chawls (multi-storied one 
room tenements with shared toilets) and pols (gated communities) in the eastern half of 
Ahmedabad (where most textile mills were located). Many of these slums continue to 
remain organized along ethnic lines (Hall, 1980).10
The housing stock in these neighborhoods is generally old and dilapidated, and access 
to public services more limited. However, these neighborhoods are near the commercial 
center of the city, where low-wage economic opportunities are most abundant (Bhatt, 
2003). Residential mobility within the city remains low: in a representative sample of 
933 households, Mehta et al. (1989) find an average mobility rate of 1.7% and in a survey
10 Also see The Times of India, “Split Wide Open: India slinks into ghettos,” 20 April 2002.
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of three slums the average duration of the surveyed households’ stay in the slum was 
between 14 and 23 years (Aandahl, 2002). Another important factor is the relevance of 
caste-based contacts in determining which trade individuals take up and where they live.
3.2 T he Inform al Sector
The urban poor in India predominantly work in the informal sector, and low-caste Hindus 
are over-represented in this group.11 Over 80% of India’s population belongs to the Hindu 
religion, and therefore born into a caste. Traditionally, the hierarchical caste structure 
determined an individual’s occupation, with weaving defined as a lower-caste activity. 
Historic, social and economic disadvantage means that the average lower caste household 
is relatively poor. Thus, the weaving communities that migrated to Ahmedabad to work 
in the textile mills were relatively poor, and after the decline of textile mills in Ahmedabad 
their mainstay became informal sector employment.
By 1999 the informal sector accounted for about 76.7% of employment in the city and 
generated 46.8% of the city income (Unni and Rani, 2000). A very significant percentage 
of these informal sector workers were women. Seasonal employment and low and variable 
pay characterize this sector, particularly among the large number of vendors and home- 
based piece-rate workers that constitute the bulk of the population we will study (Unni 
and Rani, 2000).
Informal sector employment is also very sensitive to local shocks; Ahmedabad had a 
large earthquake in 2001, significant social unrest and riots in 2002, and an outbreak of 
the Chikungunya virus in 2006. All of these were significant negative income shocks for 
the urban poor in Ahmedabad.
11 We refer to the informal sector as one with casual employment, as opposed to having contracts and 
formal guarantees (Organization, 1993).
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3.3  SEW A U nion  and th e  H ousing L ottery
The union for female informal workers in Ahmedabad, Self Employed Women’s Associa­
tion (SEWA) Union was formed as a trade union in 1972, and today has a membership 
of over 700,000 workers in all of India, with over 500,000 workers in Gujarat. SEWA 
describes its core role as organizing female informal sector workers so that they achieve 
secure employment and are economically self-reliant.
SEWA Union is organized as a collection of trade groups, one of which is beedi rollers. 
The Union began working with beedi rollers in 1978, when they campaigned with the 
government to get home-based workers included under labor laws. During this campaign, 
the Union found out that within the informal sector, the beedi industry is among the few 
trades that are regulated by law — The Beedi and Cigar Workers Act. Importantly, this 
act had a provision for government housing subsidies for beedi workers. Knowledge of this 
Act coincided with a growing recognition by SEWA Union that a beedi worker’s home 
was not only her principle place of production but potentially her most significant asset.12 
The insecure and low-quality shelter of beedi workers in Ahmedabad was identified as 
a challenge to income generation. A key concern was the high and frequently changing 
rents faced by these households.
Therefore, the Union came to believe that a group housing program, which would 
be eligible for subsidy under the government’s Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, would 
lead to low mortgage payments and would imply a significant savings (relative to paying 
rent). In interviews, Union officeholders state that they considered this the key income 
generating channel associated with a housing program. Alongside, they believed that 
having a secure house would enable children to go to school consistently. Finally, the
Union’s interest in female empowerment led them to emphasize the need for housing
12 Beedi rollers typically work at home on a piece-rate basis. An agent supplies raw materials and pays 
women for finished beedis that he then sells to beedi companies. The rate for beedis at the end of 
2007 was about one dollar (Rs.40-42) for 1,000 rolled beedis, which requires two half-days of work.
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titles to be in the woman’s name so a husband would be unable to sell a house without 
his wife knowing.
As a first step, the Union conducted a survey of its members to identify beedi workers 
with a monthly household income below Rs.700. This gave them a sample of 497 women 
primarily representing two caste groups, Koshti (35%) and Padmasali (41%) with the 
third largest group being Muslim (10%).
They then approached the government’s Beedi Workers Welfare Fund, who asked 
SEWA to work out a group housing scheme. SEWA, noting that 1987 was the Year of 
Shelter for the Homeless, brought together the Housing and Urban Development Cor­
poration (HUDCO), the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA), the Beedi 
Workers Welfare Fund and the Gujarat Government’s Ministry of Labour. SEWA’s web­
site describes their contributions as: “each of them agreed to contribute: HUDCO to 
provide loans, AUDA to identify a piece of land under the scheme allocating land for the 
economically weaker sections and to build the houses, the Beedi Workers Welfare Fund 
to provide subsidies and the Gujarat Government to sponsor the scheme. SEWA said it 
would mobilize the women beedi workers, and SEWA Bank undertook the responsibility 
of collecting repayment of the loans.”
SEWA Union identified the 497 women sample (described above) as eligible for the 
lottery, and all women agreed to enter the lottery. The lottery was conducted publicly on 
International Housing Day in 1987. Slips of paper representing the 497 women were put 
into a bowl and the second in command at SEWA drew 110 names. These 110 women 
were given the opportunity to purchase houses in the newly constructed area we refer to 
as Colony A.
The Union worked with the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority to identify 
land, construct homes, and secure housing loans. The largest hurdle turned out to be 
finding suitable land on which to build the development. Ultimately, the houses were
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built on vacant government land situated on the periphery of the city, near the new (at 
the time) international airport, which was further away from the city center than the 
initial location that was targeted for development. The units are single-story row-houses 
of approximately 200 square feet, sharing a wall with next door houses, and a narrow 
alley between rows that are built back-to-back. The area has an open public space where 
a temple was also constructed.
Importantly, as is true with much public housing, units in Colony A were ultimately 
provided to winners at a substantial subsidy. The construction cost of the new homes was 
Rs.24,800. Winners of the lottery paid Rs.900 as a down payment and were given 20-year 
housing loans, guaranteed by the Union. Those who took up the loan were required to 
repay Rs.124 (about US $2.75) in monthly installments for a nominal total of Rs.29,760. 
Under relatively conservative assumptions, winners received a subsidy of around 30% of 
the value of the property when they received the house at the end of 1993. The houses are 
currently valued at Rs.60,000 -  Rs.70,000, or approximately US $1,330 -  $1,550, which is 
almost entirely accounted for by changes in nominal prices over the period.13
Winners of the lottery did not receive titles to their homes; instead they received an
“allotment letter,” which is converted to a title only after all mortgages have been repaid.
These allotment letters (and the future titles) were given in the beedi worker’s name.
Those who accepted the loan were not allowed to rent or sell the property until the title
had been transferred to them from the bank (although family members could occupy the
residence), hence they were expected to maintain the residence for 20 years.
13 Rs.60,000 in 2007 Rs. is approximately equal to Rs.24,800 in 1993 Rs. according to the national
CPI.
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3.4  C on stru ctin g  th e D atase t
3.4.1 Sample
A key issue in constructing and analyzing the dataset of lottery participants is the fact that 
a hard copy of the list of the 497 women who entered the lottery in 1987 has not survived. 
Therefore, a first step of the dataset construction was identifying the participants. We 
were able to identify up to 463 of the participants. Below, we describe the procedure 
followed and in Section 4 we describe how our analysis controls for potential biases in 
who was not identified. The first source of names is the official and complete list of 
lottery winners, which includes participant name and address in Colony A. We refer to 
this as the “winners list.” The 387 non-winners of the original lottery were invited to pay 
Rs.250 and participate in a second housing draw. Due to operational challenges, SEWA 
Union decided not to pursue a second lottery in the end, but they kept the list of 297 
non-winning women who had decided to enter and were able to supply us with it. This 
list consisted of name, age, and, for some women, an address at the time of the lottery. 
We call this the “non-winners list.”
Our third source is a partial listing of the participants (literally, two pages of the full 
list), which survived in the home of a former employee. This subset lists 109 women, 
both winners and non-winners among them. Out of 109 names, 83 were already named 
on either the winners list or the non-winners list, therefore it provided us with the names 
of an additional 26 women who lost the original lottery. In addition to giving us more 
names, this Participant Subset list also provides some baseline characteristics (address, 
marital status, husband’s occupation in 1987 and participant, husband and household 
income).
Our fourth source of names is referrals from women who were in the lottery. In our 
tracking survey we have located additional non-winners by asking for names of friends
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and relatives who also participated. Participants named 91 women, of which 30 are new 
names not covered on our other lists. This list is called the Referrals. It is possible that 
participants believe getting on our list will allow the referrals to participate in another 
housing program, or the second draw that never happened, despite our surveyors insistence 
otherwise. Since we are unable to verify that referred women participated in the original 
lottery, our analysis will control for verifiability.
After constructing the participant list we also had to track these participants, many of 
whom had moved from their original address. If a participant did not live at the original 
address then we asked neighbors. In addition, we searched for participants’ names on 
recent SEWA Union membership rolls and in SEWA Bank client records. Several women 
who work for different branches of SEWA — the Union, the Bank, and the Insurance 
group, also helped us identify participants. The main organizers of the lottery in 1987 
scrutinized lists for names they knew. We also read out a list of unfound participants 
at a Union meeting in April 2007. In addition to SEWA, we used other beedi networks 
to locate participants and talked to important beedi agents in areas where many beedi 
workers lived in 1987. Finally, we looked for names of the unfound women on the 2004 
Ahmedabad electoral rolls. Appendix Table 1 shows our final tracking status.
Of the 463 named participants, 23 women have moved out of Ahmedabad. We tracked 
17 of them as far away as Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Chennai. Another 29 women have 
died, and we were able to locate children or husband of 25 of them. An additional four 
women were located but unable to answer the survey due to incapacity, and their families 
were surveyed in their place. We were unable to track a final address for 10 women. 
Overall we surveyed 443 participants (or their family member in case of death or mental 
illness). Our final response rates are 89% of the original 497 participants and 96% of the 
463 participants who could be named. No one refused the survey.
The biggest concern with our participant procedure is differential attrition among
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winners and non-winners. For instance, it may be that the richest non-winners chose 
not to enter the second lottery and therefore the non-winner list consists of the poorest 
non-winners. Alternatively, it may be that the poorest and least informed non-winners 
were less likely to know about and enter the second lottery. In ongoing work, we check 
the robustness of our results using the random participant sample.
3.4.2 Survey
Our main survey was conducted between May and October 2007 and focused on obtaining 
a full mobility, housing and employment history for the participant and her immediate 
family (husband and children). We have additional modules on children's education, 
health, and the use of financial products. We also collected information on collective 
action, social networks, immediate neighbors, and beedi rolling. Finally, we obtained in­
formation on major shocks faced by the household and their coping mechanisms. Between 
February and April 2008 we revisited respondents to get additional information on the 
places they lived in 1987 and mapped them using handheld GPS devices.
3.5 C hecking B alance o f th e  F inal Sam ple
Given that our participant sample differs from the original participant sample we report 
multiple randomization checks in Table 1. Specifically, we examine whether outcome 
variables in 1987 varied across winners and non-winners in different samples.
In Panel A we start with the analysis sample, which covers the 443 identified and 
located participants. We observe a slight imbalance in Muslims, with Muslims being 
over-represented in the non-winner category by 6.5 percentage points. In this panel, we 
also report a randomization check for surveyed participants using data from the survey 
pertaining to individual and household-level characteristics before the housing lottery took 
place. There are no significant differences between the means for winners and non-winners
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in any of the other 25 variables tested in Panel A.
Panel B examines the 463 identified participants. We tracked a similar fraction of 
winners and non-winners despite having a list of all of the winners but not the non-winners 
from the start. This indicates that our multi-stage process of naming non-winners did 
not make them easier or harder to locate than winners.
Next, in Panel C we consider a random subsample of the original participant list: the 
Participant Subset. The results indicate that we observe no significant differences between 
winners and non-winners in this group for 1987 marital status, income, distance to the 
centers of the city, or husbands’ occupation.
Additional regressions (Appendix Table 2) indicate that while our surveyors were 
better able to find respondents who were named, which all winners were due to SEWA 
keeping a list of winners, this is not correlated with the dates that the other lists were 
made.
Thus, overall the main imbalance we see is by religion — to check that this does not 
reflect corruption (where Muslims were systematically prevented from winning) we esti­
mate regressions which examine the perceived fairness of the lottery process. In Appendix 
Table 3, column (1) the outcome is respondent perception of whether the lottery was con­
ducted fairly. Unsurprisingly, winners are more likely to perceive the lottery as having 
been fair, but we do not observe any difference across Hindu and Muslim participants. In 
column (2) we examine if there are differences by religion based on whether participants 
state having won the lottery — again, we see that the main predictor is having won the 
lottery according to the SEWA list and there is no difference by religion. That said, 
throughout the paper we present both the experimental estimates and estimates where 
we control for tracking procedure and religion/ethnicity of participant.
23
4 R esults
We now turn to an evaluation of the impact of winning a house in Colony A on slum- 
dwellers’ locations and long-run outcomes associated with moving to the more remote 
location. Since the lottery led to random allocation of housing to winners, we can interpret 
the Intent to Treat (ITT) estimates as capturing the causal impact of receiving the housing 
opportunity. To obtain the ITT estimates we estimate:
Yi =  a  +  Piwinneri +  Xi + q (1)
Throughout, we report estimates with and without a set of controls. Our set of 
controls responds to the fact that our sample is imbalanced on religion, and so we include 
controls for ethnic identity (using indicators for whether the household is Muslim, Koshti 
caste, or another caste, omitting Padmasali caste). We also include indicator variables for 
participants whose name was referred by another member (rather than on a list from the 
Union), and a binary equal to one if a family member responded to the survey because 
the lottery participant has died or is unable to answer due to mental illness. This vector 
of covariates is denoted by Xi.
In Section 4.1 we start by examining how winning the lottery in 1987 influenced 
a participant’s decision to relocate, and consequent housing history. In Section 4.2 we 
examine the impacts of winning on respondent income and occupation and their children’s 
educational and marriage outcomes. Finally, Section 4.3 examines impacts on social 
interaction and cooperation.
4.1 L ocation  and H ousing C haracteristics
In Table 2 we explore the implications of winning the housing lottery on housing outcomes. 
We first examine relocation (Panel A) and then the impact of winning on current housing
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outcomes (Panel B). Finally, since mobility, in general, is high for our participant pool 
our survey collected detailed data on each residential location between 1987 (when they 
entered the lottery) and 2007. The data included the number of years spent in that house 
and housing history between entering the lottery in 1987 and completing the survey in 
2007. In Panel C we report outcomes that are a weighted average of the outcome in each 
of the locations in which the participant resided between 1987 and 2007.
As described in Section 3.3, the opportunity to take out a mortgage for a home in 
Colony A represented a significant financial opportunity, given that SEWA offered units 
at a subsidy of at least 30%. Hence, not taking up the loan when given the opportunity 
entails leaving a substantial amount of money on the table. Nearly all of the winners 
accepted the mortgage and the allocation letter. However, relocating to Colony A among 
those who took the mortgage was far from complete. The first row of Panel A shows 
immediately that only 67% of winners report having ever lived in Colony A.14 Among 
those who moved, the average amount of time spent in Colony A was just over 6.5 years. 
In Panel B we see that fourteen years after residents moved into the property, roughly 
34% of winners still live there. Figure 1 plots the distribution of years spent in Colony 
A for the sample of winners. Here we observe that, although the majority of movers 
report that they eventually move out and sell or rent the property on the informal market 
(prior to loan repayment), approximately 60% of participants who moved in stayed on the 
property for at least 10 years, and 85% stayed at least five years. Hence, it is reasonable 
to anticipate significant relocation impacts on at least 85% of the movers, or roughly half 
of the winners.
As expected, regression results in Panel B indicate that current housing of winners 
is higher than average quality (as measured by the durable construction index), but 
also significantly more remote than the average non-winner's residence. On average,
14 See Appendix Table 4 for the results of a regression estimating relocation of the winners on the 
Participant Subset list using baseline income, marital status, and husband occupation.
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winners reside an additional mile away from the city center. In Panel C we see that 
winners report a higher average distance to the nearest hospital (averaged across all 
residential locations from 1987-2007), although there is no evident difference in access 
to public schools, presumably because there is a reasonably well-distributed supply of 
schools throughout the city. Winners' sons also live further from the city-center (Panel 
B), though the point estimates suggest that this difference is smaller (we explore this 
further when examining children's outcomes). A visual representation of these spatial 
differences in location is provided in Figures 2 and 3 which map winner and non-winner 
housing in 1987 and 2007.
In terms of neighborhood composition, we do not observe any significant difference 
in housing density. In 2011 we worked with a real estate agent to evaluate house prices 
in neighborhoods where winners and non-winners currently reside. Due to capacity con­
straints, the agent was not able to value all 443 houses. In order to maximize the number 
of houses valued, we selected the five most popular neighborhoods and had the real estate 
agent estimate a value for all participants' homes within these areas. This yielded 109 
homes, or 28% of non-winners and 34% of winners due to the concentration in Colony 
A. As we see in Panel B there are no systematic differences in housing prices in neigh­
borhoods where winners reside relative to where non-winners reside. Consistent with 
this, in Panel C we see no reported difference in the safety of neighborhoods in which 
winners and non-winners have resided over the past several years. Thus, it appears that 
twenty years later non-winners live in neighborhoods that had similar levels of average 
wealth as winners, but (based on the durable construction index) are among the poorer 
residents of these neighborhoods. The fact that non-winners live in worse housing but 
not in systematically poorer neighborhoods at baseline suggests that we should anticipate 
only limited neighborhood effects (unlike those observed in studies such as MTO, which 
involve subjects relocating from very poor to relatively wealthy neighborhoods).
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It is also somewhat surprising that we observe little difference in housing investment 
between winners and non-winners, which may reflect a combination of greater need for 
housing improvements among non-winners, but greater incentive to invest among winners 
due to greater ownership rights. In particular, in Panel B we also see that winners enjoy 
greater opportunity for home ownership. While rates of home ownership are relatively 
high in this population - 70% of the non-winners report owning a house - the percentage 
of winners reporting owning their own home is 9 percentage points higher. While both 
winners and non-winners report similar rates of title possession, the housing program 
made it much more likely that an adult woman (the participant) reports having a title in 
her name. This effect is strongly significant even when we restrict the sample to winners 
and compare respondents who moved to Colony A to those who did not (not shown here). 
Thus, winning and moving to Colony A made it significantly more likely that a woman 
had the title for a house in her name twenty years later. However, we do not see this 
translate into greater decision-making power for women (Panel B).
These results imply that even among a subset of individuals who had fought hard to 
bring about the new housing opportunity, the indirect costs of moving from slum housing 
in the city center to Colony A were incredibly large for the 33% of winners who never 
relocated. Given that these were all individuals who had chosen to participate in the 
mortgage lottery when the only unknown feature was location, we can presume that the 
individuals who opt out do so because the difference between the final and anticipated 
location greatly changed the private value of the housing program.
A natural question that arises from this finding is: What aspect of the housing location 
makes it so much less valuable to potential residents? That is, why are so many individuals 
who are looking to purchase a home outside of their current slum location and who desire 
to move into housing with fellow beedi-makers unwilling to move even when offered a 
chance to purchase an asset, which can be formally transferred in 20 years, at a significant
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subsidy? Although housing may be considered a risky asset, the implied return on such 
an investment is large enough to swamp any reasonable change in housing values over 
the period. Hence, it appears that the location of the property and implicit requirement 
that the household reside in that location for twenty years was associated with significant 
costs.
To investigate the nature of these costs, in the following tables we examine the causal 
effect of opportunity to relocate on various measures of household well-being.
4.2 E conom ic W ell-B ein g
Table 3 reports the program’s effect on household composition and demographic out­
comes. In general, we see no measurable differences across winners and non-winners in 
key household characteristics that have the potential to be influenced by housing location, 
including fertility, current health status, and labor force participation.15 On average, both 
winners and non-winners report living close to two sons and two daughters, and the vast 
majority of participants and their husbands are currently employed.
The only notable differences in living patterns are that winners are significantly less 
likely to live with their sons, and correspondingly live in weakly smaller households. This 
pattern is consistent with results from the previous table on neighborhood geographic iso­
lation: the greater distance to employment opportunities is likely to discourage extended 
family members from cohabitation.
Table 4 reports traditional measures of economic well-being. Overall, in all, we observe 
strikingly few differences between lottery winners and non-winners in terms of economic 
outcomes 14 years after obtaining possession of Colony A housing. Total and individual
household members’ incomes are virtually identical across treatment groups, and there
15 Appendix Table 5 tests individual measures of current health of the participant, her husband, and 
her children, and demonstrates no important and significant differences between winners and non­
winners.
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are no visible differences in patterns of consumption, savings, or borrowing.
Additionally, work histories of participants do not appear to be affected by the fi­
nancial incentive to relocate in terms of rates of unemployment or work hours over the 
14-year period. While the absence of employment effects on participants may result from 
the fact that they are primarily home-based workers, the absence of employment effects 
on husbands is more surprising given the documented change in distance from the city 
center. The only significant difference in labor force participation is the likelihood that 
a participant holds a second job, which is 4% among non-winners and only 1% among 
winners. This is once again consistent with the other pieces of evidence that winners are 
more isolated from work opportunities, however it is worth noting that the differences are 
small in magnitude and only marginally significant. Consistent with this interpretation, 
we also observe weak evidence that husbands are significantly more likely to commute to 
work: 93% of winners and only 85% of non-winners report having husbands who work 
outside the home, conditional on currently working.16
As reported in Table 5, adult children also appear to benefit little from the housing 
lottery. In these regressions, where applicable, we look separately at the program effect 
on sons and daughters by including dummies for treatment and gender of child, along 
with the interaction between treatment and gender. In this table, column (2) presents 
the estimate of the program effect on sons, and the sum of columns (2) and (3) gives the 
program effect on daughters (column 4). Throughout, we cluster standard errors at the 
household level. Columns (5) through (7) repeat the analysis with covariates.
Overall, adult children of winners and non-winners look very similar in terms of school­
ing, marriage and employment outcomes. While sons appear to be slightly more likely 
to marry within caste, the result is not robust to the inclusion of basic controls, and the 
mean of the variable is so high (0.99) that differences are not particularly informative.
16 Approximately 18% of husbands have retired, and this rate is the same for husbands of winners and 
non-winners.
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The only child outcome that appears to be significantly and robustly different across treat­
ment groups is the frequency with which participants interact with their adult children, 
with winners reporting less frequent contact with daughters and living further away from 
their adult sons. Given that daughters of winners and non-winners are equally likely to 
be married, this suggests that winners' daughters are relocating to more central parts of 
the city for school or marriage. In sum, isolation appears to be the major impact of the 
program on households.
4.3  Im pact on Social In teraction s and C ooperation
Taken together, the findings from Tables 2 through 5 suggest that, 14 years after entering 
the lottery for the housing program, the demographic and economic well-being of winning 
and losing households are roughly the same. The one difference that emerges across the 
various dimensions of well-being is differences in isolation. Winners live further from the 
city center, are less likely to have adult children living with them and see their daughters 
less frequently.
Given the apparent impact on degree of isolation, we now examine whether relocation 
also influenced the social and risk-sharing networks of winning households.
Our survey asked respondents about each of the households who live in the four houses 
near them (across, behind, left and right) and how often they socialize through conversa­
tion, drinking tea together, or sharing a meal. The average respondent has 2.7 immediate 
neighbors, and this number does not vary with the lottery outcome of the household. We 
use all responses to construct a pair-level dataset in which the unit of observation is at the 
respondent-neighbor level and cluster standard errors at the respondent level. The results 
are in Panel A of Table 6. Overall, respondents’ interaction with immediate neighbors is 
high, and significantly greater for those encouraged to relocate: 95% of pairs have ever 
socialized and this number is 3 percentage points higher for winners. This is particu­
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larly surprising given that winners are significantly less likely to have neighbors from the 
same caste, and suggests substitution of neighborhood caste networks for occupational 
networks. The probability of living next to a beedi worker is 12 percentage points higher 
for winners. In light of the previous findings on geographic isolation, the shift in network 
composition likely reflects the difficulty of maintaining within-caste ties when geographic 
distance increases.
In Panel B we examine whether winning the lottery changed a beedi worker’s broader 
social network. We measure this in three ways. First, we examine whether the respondent 
has someone she can talk to about personal affairs, work and with whom she can spend 
leisure time. The first three rows of Panel B show that 84% of the respondents state 
having access to such a network member and 77% state that the person lives in their 
neighborhood. Winners are more likely to report that the person they socialize with is a 
neighbor. Thus, it is clear that households rely on very local networks.
Next, in Panel C we examine the risk-sharing (or borrowing and lending) networks of 
households. We start by studying whether the household has individuals it can rely on 
for borrowing or lending. We make use of four questions in which the (living) respondent 
was asked from whom she borrows or lends items and details about this person.17 We first 
check if there is anyone the respondent can borrow from or lend to for any of the questions 
where the dependent variable is an equally weighted average for the four outcomes. On 
average, 88% of the non-winners have access to such a network, and this number is 7 
percentage points lower for winners. Winners and non-winners are as likely to draw this 
person form the same neighborhood (84%) and same caste (62%). However, winners have
known the people who they share risks with for roughly three years less.
17 The four questions are: Who is the person you trust enough to lend Rs.50 for 24 hours? Who is the 
person you would ask to borrow Rs.50 from for 24 hours? Who is the person you would go to if you 
needed to borrow kerosene or rice for one day? In case of a health emergency, whom would you go 
to for borrowing Rs. 500? Appendix Table 6 presents regressions estimating these borrowing and 
lending outcomes individually.
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Finally, in Panel D we examine the impact of changing networks. To do so, we make 
use of the fact that the city of Ahmedabad experienced several citywide shocks in the 
six years preceding our survey. These included an earthquake in 2001, communal riots 
in 2002 and both floods and a viral epidemic (called Chikangunya) in 2006. We start by 
examining whether the respondent household was exposed to any of these shocks. Over 
90% of households report experiencing at least one shock, with the average household 
experiencing 2.76 shocks. These shocks were costly for households, as measured by days 
of work lost. In general, we observe relatively limited risk sharing in response to these 
shocks (likely reflecting the aggregate nature of these shocks). Lottery winners essentially 
report receiving no help after a shock, and non-winners received help for 2% of the shocks. 
While the difference is significant, they are both extremely low values. This is, however, 
consistent with the above evidence from hypothetical questions about availability of in­
formal insurance. Thus, it would appear that in both real and hypothetical scenarios, 
winners report less ability to rely on friends and family for help in the event of shocks.
Survey data on current participation in the bidi workers union that all respondents 
belonged to at the time of the lottery provides another check on network connectedness 
(Panel E). Twenty years later we see that 87% of respondents still belong to the Union, 
and that this number is similar across lottery winners and non-winners consistent with 
their continued work activities. However, while roughly 58% of non-winners report having 
attended any Union meeting over the last year, this number is 26 percentage points lower 
among winners. This pattern provides further evidence that due to geographic isolation, 
lottery winners invested less in maintaining social ties with the broader community of 
bidi workers, and substituted towards more local ties that were less costly to maintain. 
Unfortunately, due to the high degree of spatial correlation in the major economic shocks 
such as floods, earthquakes and riots, these more localized networks were also less valuable 
in terms of providing informal insurance.
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In Table 7 we consider collective action in the neighborhood. Each respondent was 
asked about her participation in activities to benefit the community over the last three 
years.18 Roughly 19% of non-winners report having engaged in such activities over the 
last three years. Strikingly, this percentage is doubled among winners. Next we ask the 
respondent to consider the most recent project she worked on and answer a series of 
questions on it. Here we restrict the sample to respondents who reported participating. 
It appears that collective action was not affected on the intensive margin -  conditional 
on working on a project winners and non-winners spent roughly the same amount of time 
and money.
While there are many potential interpretations for this pattern, one possibility is 
that more isolated, localized networks are better able to coordinate around public goods 
provision for the same reason that they are bad at providing informal insurance: localized 
networks entail a higher degree of correlation in the benefits of and hence preferences over 
public goods such as infrastructure.
5 Q ualitative Evidence
In the fall of 2011 we interviewed a sample of winners and non-winners. We classified 
participants in four strata: whether the participant lost the lottery, won the lottery but 
did not move to Colony A, won and initially moved to Colony A but then left, and won 
and still lives in Colony A. Within each group we randomly selected respondents. We 
spoke with 21 lottery participants, yielding interviews with five non-winners, four winners 
who never moved, six winners who moved into Colony A and later moved out and six 
winners who moved into Colony A and are still there. The interviews were recorded and 
then transcribed.
18 The specific question asked was, “What activities or problems have you worked on with your neigh­
bors to benefit the community in the past three years?” Appendix Table 7 lists the number and 
types of activities undertaken.
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Our interviews were semi-structured and probed respondents on two main themes: 
their housing status and its implications for both their economic and subjective well­
being, and their networks. In this section, we summarize the salient findings from these 
interviews. Our aim is to use these interviews to generate plausible hypotheses for two 
key findings from our quantitative analysis: the limited change in the economic well-being 
of winners (relative to non-winners) and the low levels of take-up of Colony A housing 
(both initially and in the long run).
5.1 V alue o f H om e O w nership
In general, winners concurred that the opportunity to move to Colony A gave them 
tenurial security and permanence that was devoid from rental housing. As one winner 
described,
“[Owning my house] is very important. Now that we won this house it is very good. 
Otherwise, if we didn’t get this house then we would have had to live on rent and then the 
landlord could say at any time leave the house. Every year we might have had to change 
house.”
For some winners this tenurial security translated into greater subjective well-being. 
“We feel proud that we own our house. We are more confident, this is our own house, and 
no one can cause any problem.” Most winners identified home ownership as a financially 
liberating opportunity to save on rental expenses. Winners recognized and appreciated 
the opportunity for asset creation afforded by their new living situation.
“I  liked that I  owned my house and that I  didn’t have to pay rent. I  liked that after 
paying monthly installments for some years this house would become my own. I  was 
[previously] paying Rs.500 as rent in Hatkeshwar but now I  only pay Rs.124 as a monthly 
installment.” Another winner stated “I  feel like I  have a property worth 3 to 4 lakhs so 
in the future if I  need the money I  can sell it...My two sons are now older and they will
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get married. At that time I  will have to sell this house and buy a bigger house for all of
us.”
The importance of home ownership was also felt by the non-winners, many of whom 
owned a house by the time of the interviews. “It feels good to own a house — to have your 
own house. If we were renting then we would have had to pay rent and at any time the 
landlord could tell us to leave.”
5.2 C osts o f Iso lation
While appreciating the benefits of home ownership, many winners emphasized the relative 
isolation of Colony A. Many early residents described Colony A as “wild” and “jungle­
like.” While most men of Colony A looked for jobs nearby, there simply were not enough 
— or any — to be had. For many of the families who ultimately left, the men had 
continued to commute long distances to jobs in their old neighborhoods. This was both 
tiring and costly for families. One woman described the commute as, “[My husband] was 
working at a public distribution system shop that was in Rakhial. He continued working 
there, in the same shop, even after we moved to Colony A. He used to ride his bicycle to 
work — it would take him 1 hour to get there. The commute was very difficult for him 
.... Sometimes he would fall sick from exhaustion. The children were always getting .sick. 
It was too tiring.” Similarly, women typically stated that their earnings were unchanged 
after moving to Colony A. As beedi rates are uniform across the city, the main constraint 
of beedi workers was their physical ability to roll more beedis. The move to Colony A did 
not affect their physical ability to produce more cigarettes. As a result beedi workers did 
not find their incomes changed by the move to higher quality housing. The lack of low- 
skilled local jobs for husbands and children meant that some respondents reported declines 
in family income. Lottery winners also noted the impact of isolation for their children. In 
the initial years of its development, Colony A was poorly connected by public transport.
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Residents endured journeys that were costly and time-consuming. As one winner who 
left Colony A described “[In our old neighborhood] Rakhial — schools, markets were all 
much closer. In Colony A everything was far away — dropping the children to school 
took half an hour. The school was in Nobal Nagar, some two kilometers away.” Other 
winners stated that rental savings that living in Colony A afforded winners was spent on 
transportation costs. In the quantitative analysis, we saw that winners live further from 
health facilities. One participant described how these additional health costs caused them 
to move out from Colony A. “My son got sick and had a very high fever which reached 
his brain. There were no medical facilities or proper doctors in Colony A who could help 
him. So, we decided to move to Bapunagar. Since then we have not been living in Colony 
A .”
Due to the long distances that their husbands traveled for work many respondents 
who subsequently moved out reported feeling “scared” and “lonely” — especially as their 
husbands worked long hours in the City. The sense of loneliness was heightened by 
the fact that after moving to Colony A some residents found themselves living far from 
their families, and subsequently felt socially cut off from their community (caste) and 
family. “When we were living in Colony A we were thinking that we were so cut off from 
everyone no one was inviting us to any functions.” Colony A’s remote location and the low 
prevalence of mobile phones in the 1990s meant that many winners were virtually cut off 
from their families and fellow caste members. Without this network, many residents found 
themselves lonely and confined to neighbors of different castes and sub-castes. According 
to one winner “The whole area was deserted and lonely — someone could die there and 
no one would even know that you had died.” In contrast, non-winners stated that their 
main network remains caste-based. “There is a sense of community here — but it is along 
caste lines. People from our caste help us, but not others.”
Some winners were also deterred by “new” residents who moved into Colony A and
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the adjacent areas that were being developed. These new residents lacked both caste and 
occupational bonds with the original lottery winners. Many described the degradation of 
Colony A with the advent of ‘bad’ people. “As people started to move into the area around 
Colony A the area began to get dirty, filled with bad people...The area around Colony A 
was not good — people were drinking and gambling. Alcohol and prostitution was going 
on in the chali across from Colony A .”
The Colony A program was designed with the assumption that poor slum dwellers 
placed very high value on tenurial security and that credit constraints limited home own­
ership in this population. The interviews support this — participants emphasize both the 
economic benefits of (subsidized) homeownership and the greater subjective well-being as­
sociated with homeownership. But the primary lesson that emerges from these interviews 
is the high costs of isolation for the urban poor, and that these costs may be particularly 
high for the more credit-constrained in this group. In the long run, many households 
responded to these high costs by moving out of Colony A. As a result, the survey data 
shows relatively muted long run differences in travel expenses. We also observe few im­
pacts on children’s long-run outcomes, suggesting that households managed to circumvent 
the costs of isolation for children — very likely, by moving. But what this meant is that 
the wealth (income) effect of the housing subsidy turned out to be relatively transitory. 
The interview results, thus, lead us to hypothesize that a critical deficit in many slum 
relocation programs is their piecemeal nature — they provide tenurial security but fail to 
enable relocation of jobs and opportunities for children.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the importance of location on the structure of networks for the 
urban poor and, in turn, the consequences of geographic isolation on informal cooper­
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ative arrangements. As networks become localized, investment in neighborhood public 
goods improves. The downside is that by relying more on others who live nearby, the 
ability to co-insure against large, spatially correlated shocks declines. This highlights the 
importance of changes in networks potentially brought on by internal migration, urban­
ization, and housing relocation programs designed to improve living conditions for the 
urban poor. We have identified five key findings from this study that may be of particu­
lar interest to policymakers. First, we observed high rates of departure from the colony 
within 10 years. This shows the importance of going beyond short-term process evalu­
ation; in terms of mortgage take-up, the program would have looked very successful at 
the outset, since there was close to 100% compliance. A significant part of this departure 
occurred after just five years, pointing to the importance of long-run tracking for long-run 
studies. Second, the combination of experimental and qualitative evidence gives potential 
reasons for these departures. A common complaint from respondents was the challenge 
of maintaining livelihoods while facing commuting costs (financial and time). This sug­
gests that addressing transportation will be important to future housing programs, and 
that they should consider the employment locations or ability to change jobs of all 
working members of the household. Third, like many other studies, we found networks 
to be important because they provide social insurance and help smooth consumption. 
Social network maintenance is costly, and concentrating investments in geographically 
close contacts can reduce costs. The downside is increased correlation of spatial risks 
within networks. Fourth, over the long term, non-winner households were also able to 
achieve a high rate of homeownership, though it was still below that of winners. Economic 
outcomes, childrens outcomes, and health are the same between groups in the long-term. 
Taken together, our third and fourth findings suggest that sustainable home improvement 
programs need to address workers housing insecurity in ways that do not require them to 
face relocation. One such solution is to build rental towers on small plots in central loca­
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tions and provide formal leases; another is to provide rental guarantees or down payments, 
often equal to 10 months rent, for leases on privately available property. If relocation is 
deemed necessary, then households need to be compensated for the above identified costs. 
Finally, further research is required to disentangle the impact on home-based workers of 
improved housing infrastructure from the effects of location and income. One approach 
may be to experimentally compare the relative impacts of relocation and in-situ upgrades 
against a control group over a set period of time.
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T able 1. R a n d o m iza tio n  C hecks
Panel A Participants Found & Surveyed in 2007
Non-Winner
mean
Winner
mean Difference
Winner
n
Winner
n
D em o g ra p h ics
Age in 2007 45.13 45.05 -0.08 338 105
[14.86] [16.76] (1.71)
Participant died or is mentally incapacitated 0.05 0.07 0.01 338 105
[0.22] [0.251] (0.03)
Muslim 0.12 0.05 -0.07** 338 105
[0.32] [0.21] (0.03)
Padmasali 0.39 0.47 0.07 338 105
[0.49] [0.50] (0.06)
Koshti 0.37 0.32 -0.04 338 105
[0.48] [0.47] (0.05)
Other Hindu Castes 0.12 0.16 0.04 338 105
[0.33] [0.37] (0.04)
Never married 0.01 0.02 0.01 338 105
[0.11] [0.14] (0.01)
Divorced/Separated by 1987 0.02 0.03 0.01 333 102
[0.13] [0.17] (0.02)
Widow 1987 0.06 0.09 0.03 338 105
[0.24] [0.28] (0.03)
Number childen born before 1987 2.62 2.62 0.00 338 105
[2.13] [2.23] (0.24)
L o ca tio n  in  1 9 8 7
Distance to center of city from house (miles) 2.28 2.32 0.05 337 105
[0.94] -[1.07] (0.1 1 )
Distance to SEWA Union headquarters (miles) 2.77 2.84 0.07 337 105
[0.96] -[1.15] (0.11)
Minutes walk to nearest govt. school from house 16.99 15.01 -1.98 327 100
[13.92] [9.76] (1.49)
Minutes walk to nearest govt. hospital from house 32.17 29.93 -2.24 327 100
[21.19] [19.65] (2.38)
Woman could not walk safely alone after 10 PM 0.13 0.11 -0.02 322 101
[0.33] [0.31] (0.04)
H o u seh o ld  A m e n i t ie s  in  1 9 8 7
House had a water tap 0.87 0.82 -0.05 326 100
[0.34] [0.39] (0.04)
House had a toilet 0.55 0.51 -0.05 327 99
[0.50] [0.50] (0.06)
House had a separate kitchen 0.44 0.43 -0.01 327 99
[0.50] [0.50] (0.06)
E d u c a tio n  in  1 9 8 7
Schooling costs per month 183.90 224.32 40.42 338 105
[338.54] [488.60] (42.38)
Note: Standard errors of differences in parentheses; standard deviations in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T able 1. R an d om ization  C hecks continued
Panel A Participants Found C o n tin u e d Non-Winnermean
Winner
mean Difference
Non­
Winner
Winner
n n
O ccu p a tio n  1 9 8 7
Husband had a mill or factory job 0.35 0.45 0.10 266 74
[0.48] [0.50] (0.06)
Time husband spent going to work 3.20 2.89 -0.31 292 83
[10.36] [9.91] (1.28)
Money husband spent going to work 0.41 0.24 -0.17 292 83
[3.93] [1.54] (0.44)
C hoice o f  1 9 8 7  location
Chose location to be near family/ friends 0.76 0.75 -0.01 327 105
[0.43] [0.43] (0.05)
Chose location for resources 0.13 0.11 -0.01 327 105
[0.34] [0.32] (0.04)
Chose location for price 0.03 0.04 0.00 327 105
[0.18] [0.19] (0.02)
Chose location for other reasons 0.08 0.05 -0.03 327 105
[0.27] [0.21] (0.03)
Panel B Participants Named Non-Winnermean
Winner
mean Difference
Non­
Winner
Winner
n n
Muslim 0.11 0.05 -0.07** 353 110
[0.31] [0.21] (0.03)
Padmasali 0.39 0.46 0.07 353 110
[0.49] [0.50] (0.05)
Koshti 0.37 0.31 -0.06 353 110
[0.48] [0.46] (0.05)
Other Hindu Castes 0.13 0.18 0.05 353 110
[0.33] [0.39] (0.04)
Found/ Surveyed 0.96 0.95 0.00 353 110
[0.20] [0.21] (0.02)
Panel C Participant Subset Non-Winner Winner Non- Winner
(data collected 1987) mean mean Difference Winner n n
Married 0.80 0.86 0.06 65 44
[0.40] [0.35] (0.07)
Widow 0.11 0.07 -0.04 65 44
[0.31] [0.25] (0.06)
Participant's Income 268.15 252.50 -15.65 65 44
[108.28] [96.16] (19.75)
Distance from center of Old City (miles) 2.49 2.55 0.06 57 40
[0.73] [0.83] (0.16)
Distance from SEWA Union Office (miles) 3.13 3.19 0.06 57 40
[0.73] [0.85] (0.17)
Husband's Income 374.66 395.85 21.20 58 41
[176.94] [186.14] (37.19)
Husband Worked in Mill or Factory 0.43 0.54 0.11 58 41
[0.50] [0.50] (0.10)
Husband Worked as Tailor 0.22 0.12 -0.10 58 41
[0.42] [0.33] (0.08)
Note: Standard errors of differences in parentheses; standard deviations in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T ab le  2. L o ca tio n  an d  h o u s in g  q u a lity
O u t c o m e  V a r i a b l e
M e a n  f o r  
N o n - W i n n e r
C o e f f ic ie n t
no controls
o n  W i n n e r
controls N
P a n e l  A :  C o lo n y  Respondent's family ever lived in Colony A 0.06 0.61*** 0.61*** 443
A  H o u s in g [0.24] (0.05) (0.05)
H i s t o r y  Years lived in Colony A 0.36 6.25*** 6.29*** 441
[1.89] (0.62) (0.61)
P a n e l  B : Respondent's Family Lives in Colony A 0.06 0.28*** 0.28*** 443
C u r r e n t  H o u s in g [0.24] (0.05) (0.05)
( o r  h o u s e  l iv e d  Lives in same house as before lottery 0.29 -0.07 -0.05 443
in  w h e n  d i e d ) [0.45] (0.05) (0.05)
Owns house 0.70 0.09* 0.10** 443
[0.46] (0.05) (0.05)
Have a title for the house 0.63 0.08 0.08 443
[0.48] (0.05) (0.05)
Title is in the respondent's name 0.23 0.32*** 0.32*** 437
[0.42] (0.06) (0.06)
Respondent's decision making control 0.49 0.00 -0.02 414
[0.41] (0.05) (0.05)
Durable Construction Index 0.55 0.12*** 0.12*** 442
[0.20] (0.02) (0.02)
Miles from house to center of Old City 2.88 1.09*** 1.08*** 423
[1.31] (0.19) (0.19)
Miles from son's house to center of Old City 2.76 0.96*** 0.93*** 701
[1.20] (0.20) (0.21)
Miles from daughter's house to center of Old City 2.82 0.53*** 0.56*** 577
[1.19] (0.19) (0.19)
Number of houses in neighborhood 114.98 -24.84 -25.96 406
[170.55] (15.31) (15.94)
Mid price of houses in area according to real estate 591,686.00 119,727.00 192,644.28 109
agent (Rs.) [633,214.80] (156,137.76) (154,104.63)
P a n e l  C : Years owned a house 13.08 1.70** 2.31*** 443
H o u s in g  H i s t o r y [8.22] (0.74) (0.73)
(1 9 8 7 -2 0 0 7 )  Amenity Index (weighted by time in house) 0.46 0.04 0.05 443
[0.34] (0.04) (0.04)
Fraction neighborhoods in which woman can walk 0.54 -0.05 -0.05 443
alone safely up to 11 pm (weighted by time in house) [0.45] (0.05) (0.05)
27937.27 -3,940.13 -2,293.57 443Total value of housing improvements made [58,509.68] (4125.77) (4001.10)
Average time to walk to nearest government hospital 32.36 5.78*** 6.67*** 443
(weighted by time in house) [19.32] (2.19) (2.29)
Average time to walk to nearest government school 14.68 0.55 1.13 443
(weighted by years with school children in house) [11.78] (1.28) (1.34)
1. The set of controls is individual indicator variables for whether participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or other Hindu castes
2. The Amenities Index is the average of indicator variables for whether house has (i) a water tap (ii) a separate kitchen 
(iii) a private toilet. The Durable Construction Index averages whether the house has (i) durable walls (brick/cement) (ii) 
durable roof (tile, cement, concrete) and (iii) durable floor (cement, stone, tile, plaster). Decision Making Control is the 
fraction of six areas (food, clothing, home, health, education, land) the participant exercises control.
3. We report OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Distance to old city from sons' houses has 
standard errors clustered at the participant level. Standard deviations in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4. The sample for "title in lottery participant's name" and "decision making control" exclude surveys to which a family 
member responded because the lottery participant has died (n=25) or is seriously incapacitated (n=4).
5. The sample for Distance to old city from sons'/daughters' houses is those living in Ahmedabad in 2007.
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T ab le 3. H o u seh o ld  c o m p o sit io n
Outcome Variable
Non­
Winner
Coefficient on Winner
No controls Controls N
Participant is alive 0.95 -0.01 -0.02 443
[0.22] (0.03) (0.03)
Husband in household 0.79 -0.08 -0.07 437
[0.41] (0.05) (0.05)
Household size 5.70 -0.48* -0.32 443
[2.63] (0.29) (0.29)
Number sons born 1.97 -0.20 -0.12 437
[1.16] (0.14) (0.14)
Number daughters born 1.73 0.07 0.15 437
[1.34] (0.16) (0.16)
Number children who have died 0.14 0.07 0.07 437
[0.51] (0.07) (0.07)
Anyone has a health problem 0.64 -0.03 -0.05 443
[0.48] (0.06) (0.06)
Participant is currently working 0.87 0.02 0.01 414
[0.34] (0.04) (0.04)
Husband is currently working (if in household) 0.78 -0.03 -0.02 336
[0.41] (0.06) (0.06)
Number working sons in household (2007) 1.25 -0.23** -0.22** 437
[1.05] (0.1 1 ) (0.1 1 )
Number working daughters in household (2007) 0.29 -0.01 -0.02 437
[0.59] (0.06) (0.06)
Notes:
1. The set of controls is individual indicator variables for whether participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or 
other Hindu castes (Padmasali caste is om itted), whether participant name came from referral, and whether 
a family member responded.
2. Health problems: persistent cough, difficulty breathing, cancer, backache, arthritis, vision problem, lung 
failure
3. The sample for questions about husbands and children excludes 6 lottery participants who were never 
married.
4. The sample for "participant currently working" excludes deceased and incapacitated participants (whose 
proportions are balanced between treatm ent and control).
5. We report OLS regressions w ith Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviations in 
brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Econom ic W ellbeing
O u tc o m e  V a r ia b le
M e a n  fo r 
N o n - W in n e r
C o e ff ic ie n t
N o c o n tro ls
o n  W in n e r
C o n tro ls N
In c o m e T o ta l  h o u s e h o ld 42 4 4 .6 0 -2 4 5 .8 5 -2 7 7 .7 4 414
(m o n th ly ) [2703.17] (3 1 0 .2 4 ) (3 1 2 .1 4 )
P a r t i c ip a n t  in c o m e 4 5 4 .56 -5 2 .4 8 -6 5 .5 4 414
[402.60] (5 6 .1 2 ) (5 4 .5 6 )
H u s b a n d  in c o m e 1083 .49 -8 5 .5 7 -7 2 .8 6 414
[1336.02] (1 5 1 .8 7 ) (1 5 5 .2 9 )
In c o m e  f ro m  so n s 23 39 .42 -1 4 7 .1 4 -1 7 8 .6 0 414
[2474.59] (2 6 0 .6 1 ) (2 6 4 .6 8 )
In c o m e  f ro m  d a u g h te r s 119.09 58 .0 0 56 .8 5 414
[383.14] (5 1 .1 4 ) (4 8 .6 9 )
In c o m e  f ro m  o th e r  h o u s e h o ld  m e m b e rs 2 4 1 .27 -2 1 .7 6 -1 4 .2 7 414
[855.85] (7 6 .1 8 ) (7 4 .8 4 )
C o n s u m p tio n F re q u e n t ly  c o n s u m e d  i te m s 1013.81 -1 9 .7 4 -2 .1 3 414
(m o n th ly ) [594.08] (7 4 .9 4 ) (7 5 .9 1 )
In f r e q u e n t ly  c o n s u m e d  i te m s 8 6 4 .6 8 27 .4 3 54 .2 9 414
[1153.39] (1 2 5 .4 8 ) (1 2 5 .8 4 )
A lc o h o l 43 .0 3 32 .9 7 29 .9 3 412
[160.14] (2 3 .9 7 ) (2 3 .7 4 )
C e re m o n ie s  a n d  re lig io u s  e x p e n s e s 35 .4 8 8 .49 9 .43 414
[72.72] (1 1 .3 7 ) (1 1 .2 9 )
L o a n s T o ta l  a m o u n t  b o r ro w e d  ( c u r r e n t  lo a n s ) 10473 .90 30 89 .64 29 55 .80 414
[30681.92] (3 4 2 8 .6 7 ) (3 5 8 5 .6 4 )
A m o u n t  s a v e d 4 1 4 7 .8 7 -1 1 3 8 .7 6 -1 0 0 9 .1 2 409
[25481.22] (1 6 2 5 .4 1 ) (1 6 0 9 .3 8 )
W o rk P a r t i c ip a n t  c u r r e n t ly  ro lls  b id i 0 .75 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 3 414
[0.43] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 5 )
N u m b e r  y e a rs  sh e  ro l le d  b id i  o u t  o f  p a s t  20 10 .30 -0 .7 2 -0 .61 443
[8.34] (0 .8 5 ) (0 .8 7 )
P a r t i c ip a n t  h a s  a n o th e r  p a r t - t i m e  jo b 0 .04 -0 .0 3 * * -0 .0 3 * 414
[0.20] (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 )
A v e ra g e  w o rk  h o u r s  p e r  w e ek  (w e ig h te d  b y  y e a r s  in 4 3 .2 7 1.18 1.41 440
jo b  s in c e  1987) [11.64] (1 .4 0 ) (1 .4 3 )
H u s b a n d  - C u r r e n t ly  e m p lo y e d  in  f a c to r y /m i l l  ( if 0 .19 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 4 332
in  h o u s e h o ld ) [0.39] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 5 )
H u s b a n d  - N u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  s in c e  1987 w o rk e d  in  a 4 .49 0.21 -0 .0 7 372
f a c to ry  o r  m ill [7.63] (0 .9 3 ) (0 .9 3 )
H u s b a n d  - A v e ra g e  w o rk  h o u r s  p e r  w e e k  (w e ig h te d 45 .5 1 1.34 2 .34 366
b y  y e a rs  in  jo b  s in c e  1987) [23.44] (2 .0 1 ) (2 .0 0 )
C o m m u te P a r t i c i p a n t 's  c u r r e n t  w o rk  is o u ts id e  th e  h o m e 0 .08 0.02 0.01 361
[0.27] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
H u s b a n d  - C u r r e n t  w o rk  is  o u ts id e  t h e  h o m e 0.85 0.08* 0.08* 261
[0.36] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
H u s b a n d  - N u m b e r  y e a r s  w o rk  w as  o u ts id e  o u t  o f 14 .77 0.13 0.43 380
p a s t  20 [7.48] (0 .7 8 ) (0 .8 0 )
H u s b a n d  - A v e ra g e  d a ily  c o m m u te  t im e  (m in u te s ) 15 .79 0.53 -0 .1 4 299
o v er p a s t  20 y e a r s  i f  e v e r  c o m m u te d [13.38] (2 .1 6 ) (2 .2 1 )
H u s b a n d  - A v e ra g e  d a ily  c o m m u te  c o s t o v e r  p a s t 3 .73 -0 .0 8 -0 .41 299
20 y e a r s  i f  e v e r  c o m m u te d  (R s .) [8.39] (1 .0 7 ) (1 .1 0 )
1. The set of controls is individual indicator variables for whether participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or other Hindu castes (Padmasali caste 
is omitted), whether participant name came from referral, and whether a family member responded. The alcohol expenditure regression adds a 
cogariate for "male age 16 or older in the house."
2. Frequently consumed items are: Food, transport excluding commute, movies, pan, cigarettes, bidi, tea outside.
Infrequently consumed items are: Cable TV, DVDs, medicine, repairs, telephones, school fees, clothing.
Commute time and cost regressions include the outcome as 0 and add a covariate for job outside the house without a commute (commonly 
autorikshaw driver or tailor).
sample for questions about husbands and children excludes 6 lottery participants who were never married. The sample for participant's work
4. We report OLS regressions with Robust standard errors in parentheses. Child currently working clusters standard errors at the participant 
level. Standard deviations in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. C hildren of participants
O u tc o m e  V a r ia b le
M e a n  N o n ­
W in n e r  S o n s  
(1 )
C o e ff ic ie n t ( w i th o u t  c o n tro ls )
W in n e r  W in n e r  * D a u g h te r  D a u g h te r  
(2 ) (3 ) (4)
C o e ff ic ie n t (w i th  c o n tro ls )
W in n e r  W in n e r  * D a u g h te r  D a u g h te r  
(5 ) (6 ) (7) N
S c h o o lin g Y e a rs  s c h o o l in g  c o m p le te d 7 .90 -0 .3 4 -1 .4 2 -0 .9 7 * * * -0 .0 6 -0 .8 7 -0 .9 1 * * * 1,492
[5.44] (0 .4 8 ) (1 .1 1 ) (0 .2 8 ) (0 .4 8 ) (0 .8 5 ) (0 .2 6 )
N u m b e r  s c h o o ls  a t t e n d e d 1.62 -0 .1 0 0 .0 3 -0 .2 5 * * * -0 .0 3 0 .02 -0 .2 3 * * * 1 ,52 8
[0.82] (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .0 5 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .0 5 )
M a r r ia g e C h ild  m a r r ie d  (if  o v e r  a g e  16) 0 .51 0 .0 7 -0 .0 3 0 .2 2 * * * 0 .0 3 -0 .0 3 0 .2 0 * * * 1 ,37 9
[0.50] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 2 )
S p o u s e  f ro m  s a m e  h o u s e  o r  n e ig h b o r h o o d 0 .30 -0 .0 4 0 .02 -0 .0 2 -0 .0 4 0 .02 -0 .0 2 1 ,37 8
[0.46] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 2 )
M a r r ia g e  w a s  a r r a n g e d  w i th i n  s a m e  c a s te 0 .9 9 0 .0 1 * * -0 .0 3 -0 .0 1 0 .00 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 1 1 ,37 7
[0.10] 0 .00 (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) 0 .00 (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 )
A g e  o f  m a r r ia g e  ( i f  m a r r ie d ) 2 3 .4 8 0 .2 6 0.61 -4 .3 0 * * * 0 .24 0 .6 9 - 4 2 1 *** 81 6
[4.37] (0 .5 7 ) (0 .7 0 ) (0 .3 6 ) (0 .5 6 ) (0 .6 7 ) (0 .3 4 )
S p o u s e  o f  c h ild  y e a r s  s c h o o l in g 6 .6 6 -0 .6 4 0 .4 8 0 .6 4 * -0 .3 7 0 .15 0.3 770
[3.85] (0 .6 3 ) (0 .6 7 ) (0 .3 5 ) (0 .5 2 ) (0 .3 4 ) (0 .5 7 )
H e a l th C h ild  c u r r e n t l y  h a s  b id i - r e l a t e d  h e a l th  p ro b le m 0 .0 3 0 .02 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 1 0 .02 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 1 1530
[0.18] (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 1 )
S o c ia l P a r t i c i p a n t  s e e s  t h i s  m a r r ie d  c h ild  a t  l e a s t  m o n th ly 0 .90 0 .0 6 -0 .2 0 * * * -0 .0 4 0 .0 7 * -0 .2 1 * * * -0 .0 5 790
[0.31] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .0 3 )
C h ild  l iv e s  w i th  p a r t i c ip a n t  o r  i n  t h e  s a m e 0 .80 -0 .0 4 -0 .0 4 -0 .4 4 * * * -0 .0 2 -0 .0 5 -0 .4 3 * * * 1282
n e ig h b o r h o o d  ( if  a g e  16 a n d  o v e r) [0.40] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 3 )
M ile s  b e tw e e n  c h i ld 's  h o u s e  a n d  m o t h e r 's  ( i f  a g e  16 0 .3 6 0 .2 6 * 0 .8 6 * * * 0 .7 9 * * * 0 .2 5 * * 0 .8 3 * * * 0 .7 8 * * * 1159
a n d  o v e r) [1.16] (0 .1 5 ) (0 .3 1 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .2 8 ) (0 .1 0 )
W o rk C h ild  o v e r  a g e  21  is  c u r r e n t l y  w o rk in g 0 .7 9 0 .0 3 0 .04 -0 .2 1 * * * 0 .0 3 0 .05 -0 .2 2 * * *
[0.40] (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 3 )
D a u g h te r  e v e r  ro l le d  b id is 0 .6 9 0 .0 6 0 .04 693
[0.46] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 5 )
D a u g h te r  c u r r e n t l y  ro l ls  b id i 0 .3 6 0 .0 7 0 .05 709
[0.48] (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 6 )
1. The set of controls is indicator variables for participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or other Hindu castes (Padmasali caste omitted), whether participant name came from referral, and whether a family 
member responded, and age of child.
2. Sample: 1602 children born to participants. 70 have died. 152 are under age 16 and excluded from questions about marriage. Distance between child and mother excludes children outside Ahmedabad.
3. Bidi-related health problems: persistent cough, difficulty breathing, cancer, backache, arthritis, vision problem, lung failure
4. We report OLS regressions with participant-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviations in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5. For "sees this married child" the p-value from an f-test with null hypothesis: winner +  winner*daughter=0 is 0.01.
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T able 6: S ocia l in teraction s
O u tc o m e  V a r ia b le
M e a n  fo r  
N o n - W in n e r
C o e f f ic ie n t  o n  W in n e r
w i t h o u t  c o n t r o l s  w i th  c o n t r o l s N
P a n e l  A : N u m b e r  o f  im m e d ia t e  n e ig h b o r s  r e p o r t e d  2 0 0 7 2 .7 3 0 .0 9 0 .1 3 4 4 3
I m m e d ia t e [0.95] (0 .1 1 ) (0 .1 1 )
N e ig h b o r s N e ig h b o r  is  s a m e  c a s te  ( s a m e  r e l ig io n  i f  M u s lim ) 0 .3 4 -0 .0 8 * * -0 .0 8 * * 1 2 2 0
[0.47] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
S o m e o n e  in  t h e i r  h o u s e  ro l l s  b id i s 0 .2 9 0 .1 2 * * 0 .1 2 * * * 1 2 1 0
[0.45] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 5 )
E v e r  s o c ia liz e 0 .9 5 0 .0 3 * * 0 .0 3 * * 1 2 0 9
[0.21] (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )
S o c ia l iz e  d a i ly 0 .8 9 0 .01 0 .0 2 1 2 0 9
[0.31] (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 3 )
C a n  r e ly  o n  t h e m  in  a n  e m e r g e n c y 0 .7 7 -0 .0 4 -0 .0 5 1 1 9 9
[0.42] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
P a n e l  B : H a s  s o m e o n e  to  t a l k  t o  o r  t o  v i s i t  a t  h o m e  ( m e a n  o f  3 0 .8 4 0 -0 .0 1 4 1 4
S o c ia l i n d i c a to r  v a r ia b le s ) [0.28] (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 3 )
I n t e r a c t i o n s I f  h a s  s o m e o n e ,  s / h e  l iv e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  n e ig h b o r h o o d 0 .7 7 0 .0 6 * 0 .0 7 * 3 8 6
[0.33] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
I f  h a s  s o m e o n e ,  s / h e  is  f r o m  s a m e  c a s te 0 .6 3 -0 .0 1 0 .0 2 3 8 6
[0.41] (0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 5 )
I f  s o m e o n e ,  y e a r s  k n o w n  h e r  o r  h im 2 1 .1 1 -1 .9 7 -1 .5 0 3 8 6
[11.86] (1 .3 4 ) (1 .3 7 )
P a n e l  C : H a s  s o m e o n e  fo r  l e n d in g  o r  b o r r o w in g  n e e d s  ( m e a n  o f  4 0 .8 8 -0 .0 7 * -0 .0 8 * 4 1 4
R is k - S h a r in g i n d i c a to r s ) [0.29] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
I f  h a s  s o m e o n e ,  s / h e  l iv e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  n e ig h b o r h o o d 0 .8 4 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 3 7 5
[0.32] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 )
I f  h a s  s o m e o n e ,  s / h e  is  f r o m  s a m e  c a s te 0 .6 2 -0 .0 2 0 3 7 5
[0.45] (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 5 )
I f  h a s  s o m e o n e ,  y e a r s  k n o w n  h e r  o r  h im 2 0 .0 4 -3 .2 5 * * * -2 .8 9 * * 3 7 4
[11.72] (1 .2 4 ) (1 .2 7 )
P a n e l  D : E x p e r i e n c e d  a n y  b ig  s h o c k  ( m e a n  o f  3  i n d i c a to r 0 .9 2 -0 .0 1 0 4 3 4
S o c ia l v a r ia b l e s ) [0.20] (0 .0 3 ) (0 .0 2 )
I n s u r a n c e N u m b e r  o f  s h o c k s  e x p e r ie n c e d 2 .7 6 -0 .0 1 0 .01 4 3 4
[0.61] (0 .0 8 ) (0 .0 7 )
A v e ra g e  d a y s  o f  w o r k  lo s t  fo l lo w in g  s h o c k 2 9 .5 8 -3 .9 6 -1 .9 5 4 0 3
[22.10] (2 .5 0 ) (2 .3 4 )
A v e ra g e  n u m b e r  o f  s h o c k s  fo r  w h ic h  r e c e iv e d  in f o r m a l 0 .0 2 -0 .0 2 * * * -0 .0 2 * * * 4 0 3
h e lp [0.08] 0 .0 0 (0 .0 1 )
T o ta l  v a lu e  o f  i n f o r m a l  h e lp  fo l lo w in g  s h o c k s  (R s .) 7 0 .7 7 -7 0 .7 7 * * -7 9 .0 5 * * 4 0 3
[500 .88] (2 8 .5 2 ) (3 2 .0 3 )
P a n e l  E : P a r t i c i p a n t  b e lo n g s  t o  B id i  U n io n 0 .8 7 -0 .0 2 0 4 1 4
U n io n [0.34] (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 4 2 )
A c t iv i t y I f  b e lo n g s ,  a t t e n d e d  a n y  m e e t i n g  in  p a s t  y e a r 0 .5 8 -0 .2 6 * * * -0 .2 4 * * * 3 5 7
[0.50] (0 .0 6 ) (0 .0 6 )
1. The set of controls is individual indicator variables for whether participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or other Hindu castes (Padmasali 
caste is omitted), and whether participant name came from referral. The person or immediate neighbor "from same caste" outcomes 
exclude the caste and religion covariates.
2. Sample excludes participants who are dead or incapacitated. For immediate neighbors, sample consists of the 4 neighbors living left, 
right, front, and behind participants. 1220 neighbors reported.
3. "Has Someone" variables are means across a set of dichotomous variables. Talk to/visit combines (i) someone to talk to about work (ii) 
someone to talk to about personal issues, and (iii) someone to visit at home. Lend/borrow combines (i) someone to borrow Rs. 50 from (ii) 
someone you would lend Rs. 50 (iii) someone from whom you can borrow rice or cooking oil, and (iv) someone from whom you could 
borrow Rs. 500 for a health emergency.
Recent shocks asked about are communal riots, earthquake, and outbreak of the chikangunya virus.
Informal sources of help exclude government assistance.
4. We report OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. For Immediate Neighbor questions, standard errors are clustered 
at the participant level. Standard deviations in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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T ab le 7. C o lle c tiv e  A ctio n
Outcome Variable
Mean for 
Non-Winner
Coefficient on Winner
without controls with controls N
Neighbors have worked together to solve a common problem in 0.19 0.19*** 0.17*** 414
the last three years [0.392] (0.05) (0.054)
If worked together, days spent in past year on most recent 8.90 3.30 3.15 95
project [10.466] (3.52) (3.3)
If worked together, money spent in past year on most recent 1589.22 -142.25 -48.00 91
project [2,154.146] (307.65) (410.4)
If worked together, most or all people in the neighborhood 0.91 0.06 0.06 94
contributed money for most recent project [0.283] (0.05) (0.05)
Voted in last municipal election 0.94 -0.03 -0.02 412
[0.232] (0.031) (0.03)
Notes:
1. The set of controls is individual indicator variables for whether participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or other Hindu castes (Padmasali caste is 
om itted), and whether participant name came from referral.
2. Cample excludes participantg who are dead or incapacitated. 
person.
4. We report OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard deviations in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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F ig u re  1. D is tr ib u t io n  o f y ea rs w in n ers  l iv e d  in  C o lon y  A
5 3
F ig u re  2. L o tte r y  P a r t ic ip a n t  R e s id e n tia l L o ca tio n s  in  1987
Dots: Non-winners. Plus Signs: Winners who never moved to Colony A. Stars: Winners who ever lived 
in Colony A. The flag marked S in the middle is union headquarters. The A in the north is Colony A. 
Map Source: Google Earth. Imagery Date: 10/31/2000.
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F ig u re  3. L o tte r y  P a r t ic ip a n t  R e s id e n tia l L o ca tio n s  in  2007
Dots: Non-winners. Plus Signs: Winners who never moved to Colony A. Stars: Winners who ever lived 
in Colony A. The flag marked S in the middle is union headquarters.
Map Source: Google Earth. Imagery Date: 4/27/2012.
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A p p e n d ix  T ab le  1. T rack in g  su m m a ry  re su lts  for n a m ed  p a r tic ip a n ts
Status
Can't be 
found to 
survey
Surveyed 
Surveyed Family 
Participant Member* Total
Can't find/ no current information 10 0 0 10
Found in Ahmedabad 0 397 **4 401
Moved away 6 17 0 23
Died 4 0 22 26
Died, family moved away 0 0 3 3
Total 20 414 29 463
Not named 34 0 0 34
Grand Total 54 414 29 497
Winners 5 96 9 110
Non-Winners 49 318 20 387
*Surviving daughter, son, or husband surveyed
**4 respondents incapable of answering personally due to mental health or age
Appendix Table 2. Checks for bias in tracking
Outcome: Surveyed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Winner -0.081** 0.003 0.003
(0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
No List -0.942***
(0.017)
Second Lottery 0.045*
(0.019)
Referrals -0.009
(0.049)
Random Participant Subset -0.060*
(0.025)
Date of list 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.955*** 0.942*** 0.955*** 0.920***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.087)
Observations 497 497 463 463
R-squared 0.010 0.614 -0.002 -0.004
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Dates of Lists are assigned as the date of the earliest list participant's name found/given
Random Participant Subset, 1987 Winners, 1993
Second Lottery, 1990 Referrals, 2007
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A p p e n d ix  T ab le  3. H o u sin g  L o tte r y  F airness
VARIABLES
The lottery was 
done fairly
(1)
We won a house
(2)
Participant Won Lottery 0.158*** 0.92***
(0.03) (0.03)
Muslim Participant 0.05 0.03
(0.06) (0.04)
Winner * Muslim -0.03 -0.17
(0.06) (0.19)
Constant 0.82*** 0.02***
(0.02) (0.01)
Observations 413 430
R-squared 0.037 0.81
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2. Column 1 was not asked when the lottery participant is dead or incapacitated.
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A p p e n d ix  T ab le  4 . M o v e  to  C o lo n y  A  a m o n g  p a rtic ip a n t su b set
Participant or family ever lived 
in Colony A
Participant's 1987 income (hundreds of Rs.) -0.64***
(0.15)
Husband's 1987 income (hundreds of Rs.) -0.26***
(0.09)
Participant married in 1987 0.28
(0.28)
Participant a widow in 1987 0.41**
(0.18)
Husband was a tailor in 1987 -0.36
(0.30)
Husband worked in a mill or factory in 1987 -0.24
(0.22)
Constant 3.20***
(0.65)
Observations 40
R-squared 0.28
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A p p en d ix  Table 5. D eta iled  H ealth
Outcome Variable
Non­
Winner
Coefficient
No controls
on Winner
Controls N
Participant Dead or too incapacitated to complete 0.06 0.03 0.03 443
survey herself [0.24] (0.03) (0.03)
Worse self-reported health status currently 0.14 -0.01 0.00 414
relative to others [0.35] (0.04) (0.04)
Has any health problem that persisted for 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 413
more than a year [0.29] (0.03) (0.03)
Took medicine for something in the last 0.91 -0.03 -0.02 413
year/365 days [0.28] (0.04) (0.04)
Breathing problem 0.11 0.02 0.01 405
[0.31] (0.04) (0.04)
Cough problem 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 405
[0.18] (0.01) (0.02)
Back problem 0.16 0.01 0.02 405
[0.37] (0.04) (0.05)
Difficult to carry a heavyload like 10 Kg. 0.15 0.03 0.04 414
Rice for a few yards [0.36] (0.04) (0.04)
Difficult to stand up from sitting position 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 409
on the floor (without help) [0.23] (0.02) (0.03)
Difficult to sit on the floor with bent 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 414
knees for at least half an hour [0.26] (0.03) (0.03)
Husband Husband has died 0.05 0.02 -0.01 435
[0.22] (0.03) (0.01)
Breathing problem 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 293
[0.24] (0.03) (0.03)
Cough problem 0.01 0.04 0.03 293
[0.09] (0.03) (0.03)
Back problem 0.04 0.02 0.01 293
[0.20] (0.03) (0.03)
Alcoholic 0.03 0.00 0.00 293
[0.16] (0.02) (0.02)
Children Son or daughter has died 0.04 0.02 0.02 1602
[0.19] (0.02) (0.02)
Living son or daughter has breathing 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 1532
problem [0.03] (0.01) (0.01)
Living son or daughter has coughing 0.01 0.00 -0.01 1532
problem [0.09] 0.00 (0.01)
1. The set of controls is individual indicator variables for whether participant is Muslim, Koshti caste or other 
Hindu castes (Padmasali caste is omitted), whether participant name came from referral.
2. Sample of participants is all found for first outcome variable and all alive and not infirm for the remaining 
participant health variables. Husband sample is all husbands for the first outcome variable and all husbands 
who are alive and living with participant for the remaining husband variables. Sample of children is all 
children born for first variable and all living
3. We report OLS regressions with Robust standard errors in parentheses. For children's outcomes, SE are 
clustered at the participant level. Standard deviations in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A p p e n d ix  T ab le  6. R isk  S h arin g
VARIABLES
Has Someone to 
lend Rs. 50
(1)
Has Someone from 
whom can borrow 
Rs. 50
(2)
Has Someone from 
whom can borrow 
kerosene or rice
(3)
Has Someone to 
borrow Rs.500 
from for health 
emergency
(4)
Winner -0.084* -0.083* -0.058 -0.080*
(0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Mean Non-Winners 0.877 0.884 0.868 0.877
[0.329] [0.321] [0.339] [0.329]
Observations 414 414 414 414
R-squared 0.02 0.015 0.015 0.024
VARIABLES
Person to whom 
lends Rs. 50 is 
from the same 
neighborhood
(5)
Person from whom 
borrows Rs. 50 is 
from same 
neighborhood
(6)
Person from whom 
borrows rice or 
kerosene is from 
same neighborhood
(7)
Person from 
whom borrows Rs. 
500 is from same 
neighborhood
(8)
Winner 0.029 -0.001 0.026 0.037
(0.037) (0.041) (0.036) (0.041)
Mean Non-Winners 0.789 0.792 0.786 0.767
[0.408] [0.407] [0.411] [0.424]
Observations 355 358 354 356
R-squared 0.044 0.038 0.044 0.034
VARIABLES
Years known 
person to whom 
lends Rs. 50
(9)
Years known 
person from whom 
borrows Rs. 50
(10)
Years known 
person from whom 
borrows rice or 
kerosene
(11)
Years known 
person from whom 
borrows Rs. 500
(12)
Winner -2.340* -2.476* -3.074** -3.452**
(1.341) (1.323) (1.352) (1.427)
Mean Non-Winners 19.665 19.735 19.474 21.049
[12.061] [11.820] [11.861] [12.070]
Observations 354 357 354 356
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.056 0.056
Notes:
1. Covariates: participant Muslim, Koshti caste, other Hindu castes (Padmasali om itted), referred.
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A p p e n d ix  T ab le  7. C o m m u n ity  P r o je c ts
W h a t a c t iv i t ie s  h a ve  y o u  a n d  y o u r  n e ig h b o rs  w o rked  o n  to  b en e fit the  
c o m m u n i ty  in  th e  p a s t  three  y e a r s?  (a ll th a t  a p p ly )
Number
Non-Winners Winners
Nothing 258 60
Gutters 32 30
Running water (not potable) 11 1
Potable running water 9 3
Improving the school 0 1
Something for the Temple or Mosque 6 1
Road improvements 1 0
Negotiating rates with agents 1 0
Wedding for a neighbor 9 2
Funeral for a neighbor 13 2
School fees 1 0
Caring for ill person 2 2
Stone wall to prevent rodents 1 0
Navratri 1 0
Lighting 1 0
Dig borewell 0 1
346 103
Notes:
1. Not asked in family surveys
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